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DISCRIMINATION, WISCONSIN V. YODER, AND THE FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION 
B. JESSIE HILL* 
INTRODUCTION 
When, if ever, should private entities be allowed to discriminate or be 
exempted on religious grounds from other public welfare laws that apply to 
nonreligious entities? This fundamental and pressing question of both morality 
and constitutional law defies easy answers. The factual permutations in which 
this issue presents itself are numerous, ranging from controversies surrounding 
the rights of churches to choose their ministers, to the claims of other 
religiously motivated employers that they are entitled to an exemption from 
providing certain benefits to their employees, to the insistence of the owners of 
small businesses engaged in commerce or public office that they need not 
serve all comers if their religious beliefs prohibit them from doing so. 
Fundamentally, however, these controversies always involve institutions of 
one sort or another; as such, they appear to raise different issues than the 
claims of individuals to religious freedom. 
In this Essay, I attempt to discern the factors that make certain institutions 
uniquely deserving of constitutional protection when legal requirements—
especially nondiscrimination requirements—conflict with their religious tenets. 
In Part I, I identify three elements that seem to make an institution uniquely 
worthy of protection from state interference. Then, accepting Professor 
Lawrence Sager’s premise that it is the freedom of association rather than the 
right of free exercise that protects these organizations, I consider some 
additional implications of this argument. In Part II, I consider the difficulties 
and shortcomings that persist, despite the considerable attractiveness of 
freedom of association as a basis for protecting some voluntary associations. 
Finally, in Part III, I propose some tentative ways of addressing these 
difficulties. 
 
* Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Case Western 
Reserve University Law School. Thanks to Chad Flanders and to the editors of the Saint Louis 
University Law Journal for inviting me to participate in the Childress Lecture. 
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I.  DEFINING AND PROTECTING ASSOCIATIONS 
Two examples help to illustrate two extremes of the contemporary conflict 
between religious freedom and the rights of individuals to be free from 
invidious discrimination. First, there is the Catholic Church, which insists for 
doctrinal reasons that only men can be priests.1 If it were not exempt, the 
Catholic Church would be found in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 for discriminating in employment on the basis of sex.2 Yet, it 
hardly seems controversial that the Catholic Church must be allowed to order 
its internal affairs in this way. The Catholic Church thus represents the 
narrowest, most acceptable example of discrimination by a religious entity. It 
is characterized by the fact that the discrimination involves a church leader or 
minister; the discrimination is clearly dictated by religious doctrine and the 
religious hierarchy; and the discrimination is entirely internal to the religious 
organization—it does not involve or affect religious outsiders.3 Moreover, it is 
clear that the religious organization—the Roman Catholic Church—is an 
established and fairly cohesive religious institution, and it sometimes—perhaps 
often—plays a central role in individual members’ lives. All of these factors 
suggest that making the Catholic priesthood off-limits to women is an 
acceptable and even necessary form of discrimination, and that the law has no 
place enforcing its secular norms against it. Were it otherwise, the very identity 
of the church—and thus of it adherents—might be threatened. 
The second example is the highly publicized case of Kim Davis, the 
Kentucky county clerk who not only refused to issue marriage licenses in the 
aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which 
legalized same-sex marriage throughout the country,4 but also tried to prevent 
anyone else in her office from issuing them.5 Ms. Davis’s case is perhaps the 
least sympathetic imaginable: she was an individual employed by a public 
entity, but acting out of her own religious convictions (not those of a broader 
association). The entity that employed her, and on whose behalf she claimed to 
 
 1. See, e.g., Terrance R. Kelly, Canaanites, Catholics and the Constitution: Developing 
Church Doctrine, Secular Law and Women Priests, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 3 (2005) 
(referencing the “male-only priesthood doctrine” of Catholicism). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 3. Nonetheless, a majority of Catholics disagree with the Church’s position. Laurie 
Goodstein & Megan Thee-Brenan, U.S. Catholics in Poll See a Church Out of Touch, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/us/poll-shows-disconnect-between-
us-catholics-and-church.html?pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/6G2T-PDQ6] (citing a poll 
showing that approximately seventy percent of Catholics believe women should be allowed to 
become priests). 
 4. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 5. See, e.g., Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail Over Deal on 
Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-
davis-same-sex-marriage.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/MBV4-MH6N]. 
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speak, did not require, embrace, or even sanction the discriminatory act. 
Finally, Davis’s actions burdened other people who did not share her religious 
beliefs. Not surprisingly, the federal courts have not sanctioned Davis’s 
exercise of religious belief in direct conflict with applicable law.6 
There thus appear to be three important ways in which these two cases are 
different. First, they differ in whether the relevant institutional hierarchy 
unambiguously supports the claimed religious exercise. In the case of the 
Catholic Church, there is a clear hierarchical structure and little question that 
the officials within that hierarchy have authority to speak for the church. In the 
Davis case, by contrast, the county clerk appeared to be acting ultra vires; the 
institutional (governmental) hierarchy did not stand with her, nor could she 
claim to speak for it.7 Second, they differ in whether the religiously motivated 
action primarily affects religious insiders or outsiders. In the case of the 
Catholic Church, only Catholics would be qualified to apply for the position of 
priest; thus, only women who have already subscribed to the rules of the game 
will likely be affected by the Church’s exclusion of them from its highest 
offices. Kim Davis, by contrast, imposed her religious views primarily on 
those who did not share them—indeed, perhaps exclusively so. Third, the cases 
differ in whether they involve discrimination within a truly close, identifiable, 
voluntary association. Although the Roman Catholic Church constitutes the 
second largest religious denomination in the United States,8 the 
characterization of the Catholic Church as a private, “close association” may 
nonetheless seem fitting in some respects.9 The Catholic Church is divided into 
parishes, and parishioners are generally expected to worship together weekly. 
Painting in broad strokes, it seems fair to suggest that they share a common set 
of values. They may send their children to the parish school, as well. But this 
distinction is seen most clearly in the comparison: in the case of Kim Davis, 
the religious exercise was engaged in by a public official fulfilling a public 
 
 6. Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 930 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (“The tension between these 
constitutional concerns can be resolved by answering one simple question: Does the Free 
Exercise Clause likely excuse Kim Davis from issuing marriage licenses because she has a 
religious objection to same-sex marriage? For reasons stated herein, the Court answers this 
question in the negative.”). 
 7. Id. at 932 (noting the governor of Kentucky had issued a directive in response to some 
clerks’ religious objectives informing them that they must perform their clerical duties). 
 8. PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE: CHRISTIANS 
DECLINE SHARPLY AS SHARE OF POPULATION; UNAFFILIATED AND OTHER FAITHS CONTINUE 
TO GROW 21 (May 12, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/files/2015/05/RLS-08-26-full-report.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6FU7-4ACN]. 
 9. The term “close association” is drawn from Lawrence Sager, Why Churches (and, 
Possibly, the Tarpon Bay Women’s Blue Water Fishing Club) Can Discriminate, in THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 77, 85 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson 
eds., 2016). 
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role. The institution represented by Kim Davis—the county government—was 
arguably the exact opposite of a private, voluntary, close association. 
An analysis of these two opposing examples—one inherently sympathetic, 
the other inherently unsympathetic—suggests that there are three factors that 
determine whether a religious exercise should be exempt from legal 
antidiscrimination requirements. The first is whether the exercise is central to 
the group’s identity, as sanctioned by the institutional hierarchy. The second is 
whether the purported discrimination affects religious insiders or religious 
outsiders. And the third is whether the discrimination occurs within a close, 
voluntary association. In describing these elements, I mean to suggest that they 
are independent, moving parts in the analysis. No one factor is necessarily 
dispositive to the analysis, but the absence or weakness of all or most factors 
will likely mean that the religious association will not (and should not) be 
entitled to discriminate. Nonetheless, on the model I have sketched out here, it 
seems fairly clear that the Catholic Church’s discrimination is justified, 
whereas that of Kim Davis (like that of Hobby Lobby, discussed below) is not. 
Interestingly, these factors map closely onto the original Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) contraceptive mandate exception for religious employers.10 This is 
yet another context in which religious beliefs—those of religious employers—
potentially conflict with a right to be free from discrimination—the right of 
female employees to access preventive health care on the same terms as men. 
The ACA’s regulations require employers, with certain limited exceptions, to 
provide insurance coverage for all FDA-approved contraceptive drugs and 
devices without cost sharing or co-pay.11 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the 
Supreme Court considered and upheld the right of a closely held corporation to 
refuse to cover certain contraceptives for its employees based on the religious 
views of its owners.12 Although this conflict between religious exercise and 
legal norms may be understood as posing the question whether there are limits 
on the ability of the government to force religiously committed individuals or 
institutions to violate their beliefs, it also may be seen as simply posing the 
question with which this Essay started: when must a religiously motivated 
individual or institution be permitted to engage in discrimination that is 
required by the religion but forbidden by law?13 
 
 10. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,626 
(Aug. 3, 2011). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2010); 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713 (2012); Women’s 
Preventive Services Guidelines: Affordable Care Act Expands Prevention Coverage for Women’s 
Health and Well-Being, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womens 
guidelines/ [http://perma.cc/X9XJ-FNKQ] (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
 12. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014). 
 13. See, e.g., B. Jessie Hill, Change, Dissent, and the Problem of Consent in Religious 
Organizations, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 419, 434 
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As originally drafted, the ACA’s contraceptive coverage requirement 
exempted religious employers, but the class of religious employers was defined 
narrowly. Specifically, to qualify as religious, an employer had to (1) have a 
mission that was predominantly religious in nature; (2) primarily employ 
members of the same faith; (3) primarily serve members of the same faith; and 
(4) qualify as a church or a church auxiliary under the Internal Revenue 
Code.14 Although criticized for its under-inclusiveness, it would seem that the 
definition of a religious employer was intended to ensure that at least some of 
the factors identified above were met. By limiting the exemption to entities that 
have a religious mission, and primarily employ and serve co-religionists—in 
addition to limiting the exemption to churches, church auxiliaries, and 
religious orders—the regulatory language ensured that only truly “close 
associations” would qualify. It would have also ensured, through the 
requirement that the religious entity primarily employ and serve co-
religionists, that the impact of the exemption on religious outsiders would be 
minimal. The first factor identified above—ensuring that the discrimination 
emanates from a command or requirement of the religion itself, as articulated 
by a church hierarchy—is not clearly addressed by the ACA exemption. One 
might nonetheless hypothesize that the regulation requires the exempted entity 
be a church or a church affiliate and requires that it have a religious values-
driven mission in order to ensure that the discrimination is germane to an 
identifiable religious doctrine. 
The factors identified above as qualifying a religious entity for exemption 
from antidiscrimination norms also fit with the characteristics identified by 
Professor Lawrence Sager as qualifying an association for special protection 
from governmental intervention. He identifies two rights of close association 
with the capacity to override antidiscrimination law, and these rights are 
applicable to religious and nonreligious groups alike: a “dyadic” right of 
association that arises from the relationship between a group and its leader or 
 
(questioning the viability of the distinction between “conscientious objection” and “church 
autonomy” claims). 
 14. The original rule exempted from the contraceptives coverage requirement those 
employers who met the following requirements (note that all four must be met, however): 
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization; 
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the 
organization; 
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the 
organization; 
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in [those portions of the 
Internal Revenue Code pertaining to churches and their “integrated auxiliaries.” See 20 
U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i)]. 
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services 
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,626. 
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leaders, and a “group-centered” right that arises from the relationship among 
group members.15 The requirement that an identifiable hierarchy support the 
discriminatory act, described above, fits closely with Sager’s dyadic notion of 
association—that the association must have an identifiable mission conveyed 
by its leaders, and that the association must be free to choose its leaders 
because of the profound importance of the leaders’ value-promoting and value-
articulating function.16 Similarly, the requirement that the discrimination affect 
only religious insiders is implicit in Sager’s description of the right as closely 
affiliated with the right to privacy and as applying primarily to the right to 
discriminate with respect to leadership and membership.17 Finally, the notion 
of a sufficiently “close” association is the lynchpin of Sager’s argument: 
associations are protected from government intervention because they are 
comprised of intimate, enduring relationships formed around common values 
that in some cases support free expression but perhaps more importantly 
“nurture the development and well-being of their members” and create a 
structure for individuals to “find [their] own way.”18 
One important difference between my description of the relevant factors 
and Professor Sager’s is that Professor Sager emphasizes that both religious 
and nonreligious “close associations” should be entitled to special treatment in 
the form of exemption from nondiscrimination norms.19 Thus, Professor Sager 
grounds the right to an exemption from at least some generally applicable laws 
not in the First Amendment’s protection for religious exercise, but rather in its 
protection of the freedom of association.20 This argument, which meshes well 
with Sager’s equality-focused approach to religious liberty,21 thus suggests that 
there is nothing particularly unique about religious associations, as compared 
to secular associations, except perhaps that they are presumed to meet the 
qualifications of close associations entitled to exemptions from 
antidiscrimination laws that conflict with their tenets. 
Arguably, the Supreme Court’s precedent could be read to support this 
view as well. Professor Sager has suggested a reading of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC22 that 
harmonizes it with decisions protecting the freedom of association in secular 
 
 15. Sager, supra note 9, at 86–88. 
 16. Id. at 87–88. 
 17. Id. at 86–88. 
 18. Id. at 86 (citing Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong With Compelled 
Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839 (2005)). 
 19. Id. at 87. 
 20. Sager, supra note 9, at 85. 
 21. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 4 (2007) (describing the “Equal Liberty” approach to religious 
freedom). 
 22. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
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contexts.23 According to Sager, it is the dyadic right of association, rather than 
a right of special treatment for religious organizations, that gives rise to the 
ministerial exception recognized in Hosanna-Tabor.24 
Building on Sager’s insight, I would also like to suggest that Wisconsin v. 
Yoder25—viewed by some as a sort of high-water mark of religious exemption 
claims26—may be read in a similar light. Yoder, of course, is the case in which 
the Supreme Court permitted Amish parents to take their children out of school 
at age fourteen, although state law required school attendance until age 
sixteen.27 Applying strict scrutiny to the Amish parents’ free exercise claims, 
in an opinion dripping with sentimentality and nostalgia for an idyllic, agrarian 
America, the Supreme Court held that the state’s interest in requiring two extra 
years of school attendance was not compelling in this case, given that the 
Amish provided their own form of education that was at least as good as that of 
the public schools.28 
Yoder is an outlier in many respects. It is the only case outside the 
unemployment context in which the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny 
to a free exercise claim under the First Amendment.29 Moreover, it has not 
been extended or applied to any other religious organization for exemption 
from schooling—and not for plaintiffs’ lack of trying.30 Further marginalizing 
Yoder, the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith felt compelled to 
distinguish it as a case about so-called “hybrid rights,” in which the free 
exercise claim was bolstered in some undefined way and to some 
indeterminate degree by the existence of a parental-rights claim.31 Professor 
Sager has thus suggested that “either Wisconsin v. Yoder was wrong; or, more 
likely, it was right because the Constitution gives all parents authority to make 
 
 23. Sager, supra note 9, at 97–101. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 26. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 625 (Paul Finkelman ed., 
2006) (citing Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional Protection of Religious 
Liberty, 70 NEB. L. REV. 651, 657 (1991)). 
 27. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207. 
 28. Id. at 225. 
 29. Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 51 (2015); Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An 
Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1994) 
(“After Yoder, the Court never again upheld a free exercise claim on the merits against a general 
law (except for three unemployment benefits cases that were virtual reruns of Sherbert).”). 
 30. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1067 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 31. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990). For 
some of the numerous critiques of the “hybrid rights” concept, see, e.g., James G. Dwyer, The 
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Employment Division v. Smith for Family Law, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1781, 1784 (2011); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith 
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990). 
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reasonable, coherent, systematic judgments about their children’s education--
whether or not they are motivated by religious beliefs.”32 In other words, the 
result in Yoder may be correct, but the case’s reasoning does not fit well within 
free exercise doctrine. 
I would argue that, puzzling though it is, Yoder makes more sense as a 
freedom-of-association case than as a free-exercise case. To be sure, the Court 
emphasized in Yoder the religious nature of the association in question and of 
the Amish parents’ claims.33 However, it was clearly the communal or 
associational aspects of the Amish religion that truly drive the Court’s analysis. 
The majority opinion repeatedly referred to “the Amish community,”34 and 
used the term “individuals” only twice, in connection with generic statements 
about education and free exercise doctrine.35 Indeed, what makes the Amish 
stand apart from other religious groups (and thus perhaps uniquely deserving 
of protection) is the fact that for the Amish, their religious faith and their 
particular communal way of life are “inseparable and interdependent.”36 As the 
Court explained, “Their way of life in a church-oriented community, separated 
from the outside world and ‘worldly’ influences,” is at the heart of the free 
exercise claim.37 It is also a claim that could sound in freedom of association—
fundamentally, the Amish are seeking a right to live as a unique and separate 
community, with a particular set of values that do not conform to—and often 
conflict with—those of the larger society surrounding them. Such a claim 
could be made by any close-knit group organized around a common set of 
values or an expressive mission.38 
 
 32. Todd Rakoff et al., Contemporary Challenges Facing the First Amendment’s Religion 
Clauses, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 101, 117 (1999). 
 33. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (“A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be 
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular 
considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in 
religious belief.”). 
 34. Id. at 211–12, 218, 222–24, 227. 
 35. Id. at 220 (“It is true that activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often 
subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote the health, 
safety, and general welfare, or the Federal Government in the exercise of its delegated powers.”); 
Id. at 221 (“Further, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient 
participants in society.”). By contrast, Justice Douglas’s dissent, which expressed concern about 
the religious liberty of the Amish children and not just the parents, contains the assertion that 
“[r]eligion is an individual experience.” Id. at 243 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
 36. Id. at 215. 
 37. Id. at 216. 
 38. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 223–24 (comparing the Amish to the monks of the Middle Ages who, 
by maintaining their hermetic communities, preserved the values and collective knowledge of 
Western Civilization against the destruction of the Dark Ages). Indeed, the Amish parents’ brief 
challenged the law as, in part, burdening their “communal association,” which they described as 
follows: 
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Crucially, moreover, the Amish parents’ claim was not just that their 
religion would be burdened by the compulsory education requirement. It was 
also that the education requirement posed an existential threat to their 
community. In their Supreme Court brief, the Amish parents argued that the 
state law “directly threaten[ed] the continued existence of the Amish church 
community, which will plainly not be able to sustain itself against the 
disruption caused to it by the marshaling of its youth into high schools.”39 
They then cited NAACP v. Alabama, a case involving the constitutional 
freedom of association, ultimately concluding that “[i]n the instant case, the 
right of association is inseparable from the right of free exercise of religion.”40 
The Court picked up on this suggestion of existential threat in asserting that the 
Wisconsin law “carrie[d] with it a very real threat of undermining the Amish 
community and religious practice as they exist today.”41 Sending Amish 
children to high school would not only expose them to values inconsistent with 
Amish beliefs, but also take them out of the community when they were 
needed and expected to take on special responsibilities, thus threatening the 
continuation and sustainability of the community.42 
The motif of existential threat is significant because it connects Yoder to 
the established freedom-of-association cases. In cases in which an organization 
claims that its freedom of association is infringed by a state law, the Court 
always asks whether a central purpose or mission of the organization is 
infringed by the state’s imposition.43 In other words, it matters whether the 
 
The Amish religion is a communal religion. There exists no Amish religion apart from the 
concept of the Amish community. A person cannot take up the Amish religion and 
practice it individually. The community subsists spiritually upon the bonds of a common, 
lived faith, sustained by “common traditions and ideals which have been revered by the 
whole community front generation to generation.” The Amish community remains a small 
brotherhood where primary face-to-face relationships are essential. The Amish religion 
requires pursuit of the simple life of the soil and mutual assistance; it is the community 
which is the indispensable means for such a life. The Amish religion requires separation 
from the world; this separation is made possible only through the closed, symbolic 
community. 
Brief for Respondents at 21–22, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (No. 70-110), 1971 
WL 126408 (footnote omitted). 
 39. Brief for Respondents, supra note 38, at 22. 
 40. Id. The brief went on to argue that their freedom of association was an aspect of their 
right to free exercise of religion, rather than the reverse, as this Essay suggests. 
 41. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216. 
 42. Id. at 211–12, 218. 
 43. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650–55 (2000) (considering whether the Boy 
Scouts were organized for the purpose of expressing certain views, and if so, whether forcing the 
organization to accept gay scoutmasters would undermine its ability to promote those views); 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984) (“There is, however, no basis in the record for 
concluding that admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization’s 
ability to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views. The Act 
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challenged state law threatens the continuation of the expressive community as 
it currently exists. If the organization cannot show that the immunity it seeks 
from state law is directly related to its mission and purpose, its challenge will 
likely fail. 
In cases where religious organizations assert rights to be immune from 
antidiscrimination laws, by contrast, they generally do not need to show any 
such existential threat. For example, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church v. EEOC, the Supreme Court recognized an immunity for churches 
from antidiscrimination laws when selecting their ministerial employees.44 The 
church was required to show only that the employee subjected to 
discrimination was a “minister”; it did not have to show that the church’s 
mission would be severely undermined or even burdened by requiring it to 
conform its conduct to antidiscrimination laws.45 Consequently, Yoder is an 
even stronger example of the associational concerns driving religious freedom 
cases than Hosanna-Tabor. 
II.  SOME CRITICISMS OF THE ASSOCIATIONAL FREEDOM BASIS FOR THE 
CLAIMS OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 
Despite the considerable appeal of the theory that associational freedom is 
the true basis for claims of religious groups that are often phrased in free 
exercise terms, this theory fails to address all of the problems raised by such 
claims. Although the freedom of association may be a more morally attractive 
and logically coherent basis for such organizational rights claims, it is not 
necessarily a more workable one. Thus, the remainder of this Essay describes 
the principal difficulties with each of the three factors identified above for 
determining when a religious organization’s discrimination is constitutionally 
acceptable. 
First, whether religious or secular organizations are involved, it will often 
be difficult to determine with any certainty whether a particular act of 
discrimination is clearly dictated by the mission of the organization. Not every 
group is the Catholic Church, which has a firmly hierarchical structure and a 
centuries-long tradition of excluding women from the priesthood. Religious 
organizations and other voluntary associations are often, and perhaps even 
 
requires no change in the Jaycees’ creed of promoting the interests of young men, and it imposes 
no restrictions on the organization’s ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or philosophies 
different from those of its existing members.”); see also Laura B. Mutterperl, Employment at 
(God’s) Will: The Constitutionality of Antidiscrimination Exemptions in Charitable Choice 
Legislation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 389, 416 (2002) (“[T]he right of association raises a 
high bar against government interference when an organization must discriminate to define its 
identity.” (emphasis added)). 
 44. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 
(2012). 
 45. Id. at 707. 
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endemically, sites of contestation; and this contestation often includes the 
organization’s most fundamental values.46 As Seana Valentine Shiffrin argues: 
[A]n important function of private associations is that they provide sites in 
which the thoughts and ideas of members are formed and in which the content 
of their expressions is generated and germinated (although not necessarily in 
harmony with other members) . . . . [A]ssociations are important . . . because of 
what happens inside of them, not solely or even necessarily by virtue of their 
relationships to the outside world or even by virtue of any internal shared 
beliefs.47 
Indeed, notwithstanding the Catholic Church’s longstanding commitment to an 
all-male priesthood, factions that act in non-conformity with this rule do exist, 
and they still consider themselves to be a part of the Roman Catholic Church—
indeed, they consider themselves to have the truer interpretation of Catholic 
doctrine.48 Or to give another example, after winning, in the Supreme Court, 
the right to exclude gay scoutmasters on the ground that the inclusion of gay 
leadership would contradict one of the organization’s key principles,49 the Boy 
Scouts of America continued to debate the subject and recently changed its 
official position.50 Indeed, one might surmise that the more vibrant an 
organization, the more likely it is to be home to such fundamental disputes. 
Second, it may be difficult to determine whether only “insiders” are being 
affected by the discriminatory conduct, or whether the association is infringing 
the rights of “outsiders” who should be entitled to the protection of the laws. 
Indeed, this precise issue was raised—if also somewhat minimized—by 
Wisconsin v. Yoder. Justice Douglas’s partial dissent noted that granting an 
exemption from the schooling requirement to the Amish parents would have 
the effect of imposing the parents’ religious views on their children.51 “Where 
the child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires,” Justice 
Douglas explained, “it would be an invasion of the child’s rights to permit such 
an imposition without canvassing his views.”52 The majority opinion, however, 
marginalized this concern by insisting that only the parents’ free exercise 
 
 46. Hill, supra note 13, at 430. 
 47. Shiffrin, supra note 18, at 865. 
 48. One such faction is the Roman Catholic Womenpriests, who claim that the male-only 
priesthood is an unjust, mistaken interpretation of Catholic history. See ROMAN CATHOLIC 
WOMENPRIESTS, http://romancatholicwomenpriests.org [http://perma.cc/LLU6-3ERU] (last 
visited Feb. 29, 2016). 
 49. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 654 (2000). 
 50. Erik Eckholm, Boys Scouts End Ban on Gay Leaders, Over Protests by Mormon Church, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/28/us/boy-scouts-end-nationwide-
ban-on-gay-leaders.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/E8R4-E9RY]. 
 51. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
 52. Id. 
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claims were before it and that there was nothing in the record to suggest that 
the children’s wishes differed from their parents’.53 
The Yoder example demonstrates that sometimes members of a religious 
organization may wish to leave or reject its premises but are, for various 
reasons (such as being underage), unable to do so. However, in some cases it 
may simply be disputed whether a particular individual is a religious insider or 
outsider. For example, are non-Catholic employees of Catholic schools and 
Catholic hospitals to be considered insiders or outsiders? They do not share the 
same religion as their employers so they would appear to be outsiders. On the 
other hand, they may voluntarily assume the obligation to live by the 
employer’s religious principles by signing “morals clauses” in their 
employment contracts. Still, there is a slippery slope here. The mere 
voluntariness of the employee’s actions in agreeing to be employed by a 
religious organization cannot be enough to strip her of the protections of 
various antidiscrimination laws since every employment relationship is 
fundamentally voluntary. Logically, that voluntariness alone cannot turn 
religious outsiders into religious insiders, even if they are in fact “insiders” of 
an organization that happens to be religious in character. 
This difficulty is particularly troubling given that associations have every 
incentive to cast as many people as “insiders” as possible. The sweeping 
protections of the ministerial exception recognized in Hosanna-Tabor apply 
only when a religious “minister”—by definition an insider, though not 
necessarily a minister in the narrow sense—is involved.54 Similarly, courts are 
more likely to express concern about the government intruding on purely 
religious matters when only members of a particular religious organization are 
involved in a litigated dispute. 
It is not entirely clear how this principle might apply to secular 
organizations, but it may partly explain the Supreme Court’s greater solicitude 
for the Boy Scouts, who wished to expel an insider and a leader based on his 
sexual orientation, than for the Christian Legal Society, which discriminated 
against potential members based on sexual orientation.55 The freedom-of-
association claim appears stronger when it is asserted against someone who is 
already a member of the association than when it is asserted against an 
outsider. 
Finally, it is difficult to say what sorts of organizations merit the 
associational freedoms protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court 
has recognized the importance of “expressive associations”—those centered 
 
 53. Id. at 230–31. 
 54. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705 
(2012). 
 55. Compare Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000), with Christian Legal 
Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 678–83 (2010). 
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around expressing a particular message—as well as “intimate associations”—
close, personal relationships such as familial and romantic relationships.56 Less 
concerned with the kinds of groups that are protected than with the kinds of 
relationships that are protected, Professor Sager has identified a “dyadic” and a 
“group-centered” right of association, but both of these are limited to what he 
calls “close” associations.57 The definition of a close association seems to 
assume some robustness, in that it must be “sustained and substantive,” and it 
may play a role in members’ “spiritual beliefs, development, and 
fulfillment.”58 
Whether we focus on the “expressive” or “intimate” nature of the 
association, or on some even more amorphous set of qualities, such as 
importance to individuals’ spiritual or moral development, it will be difficult in 
many cases to determine which associations do and do not qualify. For 
example, might a for-profit corporation qualify if it is closely held and run on 
explicitly stated religious principles?59 Again, it is not hard to imagine that 
many a secular organization will seek the status of a “close” association, 
especially if that status brings with it an immunity from certain kinds of 
liability. 
Moreover, even setting secular organizations aside, it is not clear that all 
religious organizations—or even all churches—should qualify. It would be 
possible simply to presume that all churches will possess the qualities of close 
associations, but unless this presumption bears some resemblance to reality, it 
is simply another way of providing special treatment to churches and 
undermining the generalizability of the freedom of association beyond the 
religious organization’s context. 
Not all religious communities are close-knit; nor, frankly, do they always 
occupy a central place in members’ lives. The late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries have seen the rapid growth of so-called “megachurches,” defined 
by one measure as churches that sustain an average weekly attendance of over 
2,000 congregants.60 This figure does not include large Catholic churches 
having similar attendance, of which there are roughly 3,000 in the United 
States.61 Indeed, the Hartford Institute for Religion Research at the Hartford 
Seminary, which produces extensive research on megachurches, excludes large 
 
 56. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984). 
 57. Sager, supra note 9, at 86–87. 
 58. Id. at 87–88. 
 59. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) (holding that 
such a corporation was protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and was entitled to 
an exemption from the generally applicable contraceptives coverage requirement under the 
ACA). 
 60. Megachurch Definition, HARTFORD INST. FOR RELIGION RES., http://www.hartfordinsti 
tute.org/megachurch/definition.html [http://perma.cc/53YT-BFVD] (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
 61. Id. 
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Catholic congregations precisely because, unlike megachurches, they lack a 
“robust congregational identity,” among other things.62 It is hardly 
controversial to observe that individuals may belong to religious sects and 
attend religious services for numerous reasons other than religious belief and 
obligation, including habit, family tradition, pressure from family members or 
peers, social status, and a simple desire to socialize.63 It is not clear that any of 
these latter reasons for belonging differ from the reasons why people join, say, 
the Jaycees, to which the Supreme Court has denied immunity from non-
discrimination laws.64 
III.  A GESTURE TOWARD SOLUTIONS 
If the freedom of association retains some promise as a more acceptable 
and logical way to understand the sorts of claims that are now framed as claims 
of religious institutional autonomy—as Professor Sager suggests—can these 
considerable difficulties with the concept be overcome? Undoubtedly, a full 
answer to this question would require much more extensive consideration than 
I can afford it in this brief Essay. However, I would like to suggest a few 
possible ways to move forward with the freedom of association. 
First, courts should have a relatively robust role in determining certain 
aspects of intra-associational disputes—in particular, questions such as 
whether a complainant is a religious insider or outsider, or whether a 
discriminatory act is required by an association’s mission or belief structure. If 
courts maintain an exceedingly deferential or “hands-off” attitude, they will in 
most cases simply favor the party with more power—usually the employer in 
employment disputes. Additionally, in most litigated disputes, institutional 
defendants will have a significant incentive to claim that the plaintiff is an 
“insider,” or even a “minister”; plaintiffs will have the opposite incentive. 
Courts should therefore begin to develop a jurisprudence that will make this 
sort of line drawing more predictable and less subject to manipulation in the 
course of litigation.65 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Andrew Koppelman, How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion, 
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In the case of secular associations, courts have already been tasked with 
determining whether a particular idea is central to an organization’s mission so 
it should not be prohibitively difficult for them to do so when a religious 
organization is involved. Some deference may be in order here with respect to 
secular and non-secular organizations alike; for example, the Court 
acknowledged in Dale that “[t]he fact that the organization does not trumpet its 
views from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not 
mean that its views receive no First Amendment protection.”66 But if an 
organization has a policy explicitly declaring that discrimination on the basis 
of gender or sexual orientation violates its principles, for example, it should 
not get a pass when it engages in such discrimination. A case like Petruska v. 
Gannon University67 is wrongly decided in my view. In that case, the Third 
Circuit applied the ministerial exception to protect a Catholic university from a 
sex-discrimination claim, although the position held by the plaintiff was not 
reserved for men for religious reasons, and she had received official assurances 
that she would not be fired from her position because she was a woman.68 
Finally, though it may be exceedingly difficult to say what constitutes a 
close association, it may be a bit easier to say what definitely does not 
constitute such an association. For example, participation in the marketplace as 
a commercial enterprise should be considered a sufficiently public endeavor to 
disqualify an organization from claims of associational freedom, both with 
respect to customers and with respect to employees (who can usually be 
expected to join those enterprises out of the need for a paycheck, rather than 
the desire for salvation). As Justice Bosson of the New Mexico Supreme Court 
explained in his eloquent concurrence in Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 
involving a wedding photographer and her husband (the Huguenins) who 
declined to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony due to their 
religious beliefs: 
In the . . . world of the marketplace, of commerce, of public accommodation, 
the Huguenins have to channel their conduct, not their beliefs, so as to leave 
space for other Americans who believe something different. That compromise 
is part of the glue that holds us together as a nation, the tolerance that 
lubricates the varied moving parts of us as a people. That sense of respect we 
owe others, whether or not we believe as they do, illuminates this country, 
setting it apart from the discord that afflicts much of the rest of the world. In 
short, I would say to the Huguenins, with the utmost respect: it is the price of 
citizenship.69 
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CONCLUSION 
The freedom of association may well ground the right of some institutions 
to be exempt from laws that apply to the public more generally. In instances 
where a legal mandate conflicts with a clearly defined purpose or mission of a 
voluntary association; where organizations’ insiders are burdened by the 
exemption, rather than outsiders; and where the association is non-commercial, 
involves close relationships among its members, and plays a meaningful role in 
members’ lives, the institution may be exempt from some legal requirements, 
such as antidiscrimination laws. At the same time, it is important for courts to 
play a role in ensuring that these requirements are actually met in order to 
cabin the tendency of the categories of “mission,” “insiders,” and “closeness” 
to expand, and of parties to exploit the categories’ ambiguities to their own 
advantage. 
 
